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Abstract
With the ongoing making of a European polity the character of political representation and the role
of national parliaments is changing. Europe is more and more facing a situation where input
legitimacy is produced at the national level whereas binding political decisions are taken at the
supranational level. This is why there is an ongoing debate about the democratic deficit. The paper
takes up this discussion from a particular perspective: how do the members of national parliaments
of eleven member states and the members of the European Parliament perceive the future of
European integration, to which degree do they support further competence shift, and which kind of
future political order of the EU do they prefer? The impact of several factors on support for further
integration are explored including policy character, exposure to economic globalization, and national
institutional settings. Results show that the ideas about institutional reform and future political order
do differ considerably between MPs of different nations, ideologies as well as the national and
European level partly due to the mentioned factors. The necessary consensus about the future order
seems to be far from feasible.
Kurzfassung
Mit der fortschreitenden Entwicklung einer europäischen Polity verändert sich der Charakter
politischer Repräsentation und die Rolle nationaler Parlamente in der EU. In der Union entsteht
mehr und mehr eine Situation, in der Legitimität auf der nationalen Ebene eingeworben, bindende
politische Entscheidungen aber auf der supranationalen Ebene gefällt werden. Das ist einer der
Gründe für die anhaltende Debatte über das demokratische Defizit. In diesem Beitrag wird diese
Diskussion aus einer speziellen Perspektive aufgenommen: wie beurteilen Abgeordnete aus elf
Mitgliedsländern sowie des Europäischen Parlaments die Zukunft europäischer Integration, welche
politische Unterstützung gewähren sie einer weiteren Kompetenzverschiebung zugunsten der EU
und welche Vorstellungen haben sie von der zukünftigen politischen Ordnung? Es wird der Einfluß
policy-bezogener Faktoren sowie der Globalisierung und nationaler institutioneller Arrangements auf
den Grad der Unterstützung einer verstärkten EU-Integration untersucht. Als Ergebnis läßt sich
festhalten, daß die Vorstellungen von institutioneller Reform und zukünftiger politischer Ordnung
zwischen Abgeordneten unterschiedlicher Nationen, unterschiedlicher ideologischer
Grundpositionen sowie zwischen der nationalen und der europäischen Ebene nicht zuletzt aufgrund
unterschiedlicher Prägung durch die genannten Faktoren stark variieren und ein Konsens über die
zukünftige Gestalt der EU in weiter Ferne ist. 
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1. Introduction
European integration is progressing at an ever more rapid rate. Accompanying this progress is
increasing debate about the institutional shape and legitimacy of this new political order. Positions of
the protagonists range from euphoric support for the „European Project“ to strong and deep-seated
scepticism. While this debate is driven in part by conflicting values, in part it is driven by uncertainty.
There is no historical precedent for the emerging European system, and the institutional imaginations
of observers are both limited and imprecise (Schmitter 1996a: 131), leaving room for all kinds of
speculation.
This paper analyzes the views and wishes of European parliamentarians both at the national and the
European level with regard to the future political order of the European Union. In particular,
parliamentary support for shifting policy authority and preferences for certain shapes of the future
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between nations, i.e. representatives from different countries and how they can be explained. Thus the
paper seeks an answer to the question, whether establishing democracy at the European level comes
close to squaring of the circle or not.
The European Union already possesses enormous redistributive powers, and in exercising these
powers has supremacy over national laws. According to Schmitter, in 1950 competence rested at the
national level in all of the 28 policy areas he investigated. Competence shifted to the European level
fastest in the economic area. In 1968 competence rested solely with the nation-state in two-thirds of
the economic policy areas, in 1992 in roughly 50 percent, and in 2001 the figure will be no more than
7 percent. In the area of welfare state policies, constitutional issues and foreign policy including
defence, the process of shifting authority was much slower and did not have its real take-off before
the 1990s (Schmitter 1996a, calculated from Table 6.1, p. 125). This development clearly indicates
progress in political integration, although it is mainly taking place in the area of economic issues. The
institutional setting of the European Union is marked by an astonishing autonomy of its institutions
from direct democratic control. As opposed to traditional international organizations and confederal
systems, European institutions „which take part in the policy cycle are de jure and to a large degree
de facto independent of national governments … this implies that ‘sovereign’ states have to deal with
political actors which are outside their immediate control“ (W. Wessels 1996: 21). 
This naturally raises the democratic question of how the system of institutions exercising this power is
to be controlled and held accountable. The system is still under construction, but that construction has
to take account of problems of legitimacy and democracy. Thus, one of the major challenges for the
future of the European Union is to solve the problem of democratic decision-making and political
representation. The current institutional order is far from sufficient to satisfy the demands. The
satisfaction of members of parliament with the existing political order in the European Union is rather
low. Neither are they particularly satisfied with the policy performance of the EU or with the working
of democracy in general. Representatives at the European and the national level share these views
(Table 1). Even if there were not a public debate about the quality and form of democracy in the
European Union, this situation would demand institutional change.
Table 1
2
It is an open debate whether nation-state democracy could serve as an appropriate blueprint for the
future political order of the European Union. It is obvious however, that, if the emerging European
political order is to qualify as democratic in any meaningful sense, parliaments as representative
institutions will have to play a central role. Although major steps to increase the role of the European
Parliament have already been taken however, increasing the importance of parliament to political
decision-making in the European Union does not mean increasing the importance only of the
European Parliament. While this might solve some of the problems of the so-called democratic deficit
of the EU, it addresses only one side of the question of European democracy. As Scharpf (1996a) has
pointed out, focusing on the European level alone is insufficient, since the increase of powers at the
European level has also called into question democratic legitimacy at the level of the nation-state.
Thus the role that national parliaments should, can, and want to play in European policy-making is
also of central importance to the future of the European order.
The analysis proceeds in two steps. The next section deals with support and constraint of competence
shift. In particular, it addresses the question whether the character of policy problems, the
globalization of the economy, the strength of nation-state intermediary systems and national
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formulated, tested, and combined to an explanatory model of parliamentary support for policy shift in
the European Union. Section 3 addresses the question of the views and wishes of parliamentarians
regarding institutional improvements in the EU and concerning the future political order. An
explanatory model of the preferences for the future political order is tested, taking globalization and
institutional factors again into account. In the last section findings are summarized and some
preliminary conclusions are drawn. 
2. Competence Shift: Positions and Explanations
European integration was—for a long time—primarily the integration of markets. This process of
economic integration led to positive performance of the national economies and contributed
considerably to the economic well-being and relative wealth of the peoples of the member states. The
EEC Treaty in 1957 had set out the future rules for trade rather clearly, but only guiding principles
were laid down for social and agricultural policy (Nugent 1989: 38). Only with the signing of the
Single European Act (SEA) in February 1986 were the first steps formally taken to incorporate
constitutional provisions for policy competencies at the European level. The main inclusions were
foreign policy cooperation, environment, research, technological and regional development. Since
then, the political integration of the European Communities has become more and more relevant, as
further decision and policy competencies have been shifted to the European level. But why has
economic integration been followed by political integration, including these tremendous shifts of
authority from the nation-state to the European level? What have been the driving forces in, and
reasons for, this process of shifting competencies and what are the factors of resistance against it? 
3
The explanations considered in the following argue from a rationalistic and institutional perspective
rather than from an idealistic one. Right from the beginning, the two camps concerning European
integration have been the realists and the idealists. Although idealistic arguments point mainly to the
public goods an integrated Europe can provide, it might be doubted that such ideals as community,
peace, wealth, and the like are the driving forces motivating political actors in the process of
integration. Two features of globalization—an elusive term, but useful in this context—can rather be
regarded as the driving force behind political integration. One has to do with the nature of policy
problems. The other is regime competition, which is, to a certain extent, self-produced by the process
of economic integration. On the other hand, forces of resistance against a further shifting of authority
can be found in variations of the national institutional settings. These are closely related to the
problem of legitimacy as well as to the problem of being the winner or loser of further political
integration. 
Answers to these three questions will be sought by setting out specific hypotheses. With respect to
differences in support for shifting competencies between policies, it will be argued that the degree to
which problems can be regarded as globalized is of crucial importance (globalization of problems
hypothesis). With respect to differences between countries, it will be argued that they are on the one
hand due to the differences between countries with respect to their embededdness in and dependence
on a globalized economy (globalization of the economy hypothesis), and on the other hand on the
degree to which vested interests place an institutional constraint on political flexibility (vested
interests hypothesis). Thirdly, it will be argued that national institutional settings account for the
differences in support for shifting competencies between members of national parliaments (national
institutional setting hypothesis). Finally, explanations are combined in an overall model of support for
policy shift.
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The process of European integration since the 1980s is often regarded as an answer to and a product
of a process of societal and economic globalization starting in the mid-1970s. Some authors even
argue that states are steadily dissolving, leaving their societies increasingly exposed to the cultural,
economic, and human dynamics of the whole continent (Buzan 1994: 13). In other words, problems
are globalizing. One expression of globalization is the convergence of problem agendas across
countries. Convergence is discussed as one of the major outcomes of globalization (e.g., Berger and
Dore 1996). A second and more direct expression of globalization arises from the nature of some
issues, which penetrate or transcend national borders. Sinnott calls them a case for endogenous
internationalization of policies (Sinnott 1995: 247f.). 
Thus there are two features of globalization:
1. the convergence of problem loads across countries, i.e., that countries face the same problems
to a similar extent, and 
2. the emergence of problems like environmental pollution which by their nature cross borders. 
4
One solution to globalized problems is to increase or to regain the initiative and steering capacity of
politics and the state by establishing adequate international and supranational institutions (Zürn 1995).
But there is clearly a difference between problem areas where the problem load has converged and
those where the problems themselves are of a border-crossing scope. Sinnott (1995: 248)
distinguishes supra-national measures taken to cope with the problems as endogenous
internationalization of governance in the latter case and exogenous internationalization in the
former. The reason is obvious: a converged problem load does not necessarily mean that the
nation-state is not able to handle the problem. It might just be more effective to do it in a common
effort. A global problem scope by definition means that problem solving within national borders is not
possible because the problem itself crosses those borders. There are two reasons for a global problem
scope. In the first case, the problem naturally crosses borders, as for example air or water pollution. In
the second case, lowering or eliminating point-of-entry barriers to the flow of economic transactions
and the encouragement of market forces by governments have inadvertently undermined the efficacy
of the nation-state’s standard policy tools (Ruggie 1994: 8), or the internationalization of governance
has already been so successful that problems can be handled only at the supranational level (Zürn
1995: 8).
As Sinnott has already noted in his attempt to classify problems and policies as endogenous or
exogenous, an operationalization of such concepts is not easy (Sinnott 1995: 262). However, in order
to explain why policy competencies should be shifted to the European level or authority should stay
with the nation-state, such an approach has a central position at least in theoretical terms.
Theoretically, it seems to be quite realistic that the globalization of problems is the main source of the
internationalization of governance in the European Union. The following interrelated hypotheses can
be drawn from such an approach:
1. The larger the global problem scope, i.e., the more problems are border-crossing by their
nature (or by already achieved levels of internationalized governance), the more likely it is
that elected representatives want to shift (even more) authority to the European level. 
2. The more global the problem load, i.e., the more converged across countries, the more likely it
is that elected representatives want to shift authority to the European level. 
3. Global problem scope is more conducive to the support of internationalized governance than
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The classification of 17 policy fields can be seen in Figure 1. It is based on considerations presented in
more detail in Wessels and Kielhorn (1999). This a priori classification is based on some empirical
grounds but nonetheless a little element of arbitrariness remains. 
A first inspection of the empirical results for members of the European Parliament and eight national
parliaments does not contradict the general hypotheses that problem load and problem scope have an
impact on the support for internationalized governance (Figures 2 and 3).
Figure 1
5
To explore the hypotheses set out above in more detail, regression analyses have been performed,
introducing problem load and problem scope as separate determinants of the average support for
shifting authority to the European level. An analysis of the mean preference of the 26 country groups
of MEPs or MNPs for each of the 17 policy areas has been performed, i.e., 442 cases. We expect
problem scope, and to a lesser extent problem load, to have a positive impact on preferences for
shifting authority from the national to the European level. 
Figure 2 | Figure 3
The average R2 from these regressions is quite high (.62). It is on average somewhat higher for the
groups of MEPs than for the groups of MNPs from eleven countries (see 2). The mean regression
coefficient for problem load is about one third of that for problem scope. Scope is somewhat more
important in the case of MEPs. Results are quite stable across groups. This is confirmed by individual
group regressions .
Table 2
2.2. Competence Shift and Globalization of the Economy
As already mentioned, European integration started with the liberalization of economic markets, i.e.,
the integration of the economy. In the context of this discussion particular emphasis lies on the
relationship between European integration and economic globalization and the increasing
interdependencies between economies. It is argued that the internationalization of the economy was
too successful. Nation-states are now feeling that their capacity to handle the impact of economic
globalization has decreased on almost all matters of relevance, in particular economic matters but also
social and cultural. The only possibility to erect shields against the unintended and disliked
consequences of the economic market on all sectors of society, it is argued, is to strengthen the state.
That is, the geographic range of state authority should be made a match for the geographic range of
the economy (see for example Zürn 1995: 8f). This obviously means the internationalization of
governance.
It can be argued, however, that nation-states and their societies are affected by the globalization of the
economy to different degrees. Given a nation with a strong domestic market and a range of
production in which neither importing nor exporting goods is actually necessary, there would be little
impact from globalized markets. On the other hand, a nation which has a very small domestic market
and whose range of production is too narrow to meet its demands for goods clearly depends on other
economies since it must import the missing goods and pay for them through exports. 
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There are huge differences between the different schools of economic thought concerning what
external economic dependency means (see the contributions in Berger and Dore 1996). It is most
common to measure economic interdependence through the external trade rate. However, this is a
largely mercantilist understanding of the role of trade. A classical economist like Ricardo or John
Stuart Mill would argue that the purpose of trade is imports, not exports. As Krugman has put it,
„exports are costs—something we must produce because our import suppliers are crass enough to
demand payment. Or to put it differently, an export is an indirect way to produce an import, which is
worth doing because it is more efficient than producing our imports ourselves.“ (Krugman 1996: 18). 
In this sense, the question of economic interdependence takes its starting point from the question of
how much imports are necessary in order to have an efficient and satisfying allocation of goods in a
country not able to produce everything by itself. Imports then are a burden to the extent that they
must be paid for by exports. Dependency then is the strength of the pressure for exports in order to
balance imports. A measure that takes this consideration into account thus must relate imports to
exports, asking how good the balance of payments is in respect to the imports, i.e., if the amount of
imports is matched by a corresponding export figure. A standardized measure for this is the amount of
imports minus the amount of exports as a percentage of the GDP. This measure takes into account the
extent to which a country is dependent on the international division of production of goods and
whether it is economically able to compensate for such a dependency. 
The globalization of the economy hypothesis thus assumes that the higher the dependency on
international trade, division of labour, and global competition, the more countries favour shifting
policy authority to the European level in order to have the same conditions of market participation
with respect to the structure of regulation, incentives, and the like. 
Empirical results support the economic dependency hypothesis to a certain degree. Those countries
that are exposed to the international economy in a negative way, i.e., their exports do not meet their
need for imports, show stronger overall support for greater competencies at the European level. In
particular, these are Greece, Belgium, Portugal, Spain and Austria. Countries that profit from the
structure of the international division in the production of goods in the sense that the demand for their
products exceeds their own needs favour the interna- tionalization of governance to a lesser degree.
Figure 4
However, the correlations are not strong. Thus, other factors have to be taken into account to explain
the differences between countries in support for internationalized governance.
7
2.3. Competence Shift and Vested Interests
Organized interests play an important role in policy-making in many national settings. The debate
about corporatism in Western democracies is one important indication of this. Research shows many
cases in which the integration of organized interests into the policy-making process produces positive
outcomes, particularly in the areas of economic performance and social policies, compared with
nations where corporatism is not as strong. Corporatist countries seem to manage unemployment
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policy-making plays an important role, the political composition of governments and how this
corresponds with the institutionalization of participation of organized interests also plays an important
role (Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange 1991). But the structure and integration of organized interests in
the policy process is of crucial importance. If interest groups gain some advantage from being
embedded in the structure of policy-making, they might hesitate to give up such a setting. In other
words, interest groups that benefit from the national setting of interest intermediation are likely to
oppose changes to it. Thus, one can assume that the existence of a strong corporatist arena
constitutes some institutional constraint on the shift in policy competencies to the European level.
However, this general assumption has to be differentiated a little bit more. 
Since their particular interests are specifically related to policy areas in the corporatist circuit, one can
assume that vested interests put a constraint on these policy areas and are rather indifferent to any
competence shift in others. The vested interest hypothesis thus reads as follows: 
1. The more interest intermediation is of a corporatist kind and the stronger organized interests
are, the stronger the resistance of a country to change to the national setting of policy- and
decision-making. 
2. Resistance exists in particular with respect to the shift of those competencies that directly
affect the corporatist arena, namely economic and social/welfare policies. 
In order to test these hypotheses, measures are needed for the degree of corporatism and the strength
of national interest groups in the corporatist arena. Data on the strength of corporatism are provided
by many experts. Lijphart and Crepaz have created a synthetic measure from many expert judgements
that is quite reliable (Lijphart and Crepaz 1991). However, it is available for only 11 of the 15
countries under investigation here. Sometimes union density is used as a surrogate measure for
corporatism, although this is obviously problematic (see Golden 1993; B. Wessels 1996). Union
density is an indicator of the strength only of one party to the corporatist circuit. Another measure,
which to a certain extent is a bridge between corporatism and strength of unions, is a measure of the
legal regulation and legal privilege of unions developed by Armingeon (1992). These three measures
serve as surrogate measures for the degree to which the participation of organized interests in the
corporatist arena is institutionalized.
Aggregate correlations between these three measures and the mean overall competence score across
countries are all negative, and with respect to union density also significant even with the small
number of cases investigated. The strength and embededdness of vested interests in the national
policy-making arena indeed make a difference. Vested interests are an institutional constraint on
support for shifting authority (Table 3).
8
Exploring the hypothesis that this constraint exists particularly for policies in the corporatist arena,
policy fields have been divided between those related to corporatism and others. The first are policies
concerning the social or equality dimension, namely social policy, health, unemployment, taxation, and
education (see Roller 1991 for a similar classification of policies). In order to avoid losing too many
cases, the corporatism score is dropped. Instead, union density, legal regulation and privileges of
unions are included in two regressions, one referring to all non-social non-equality related policies and
one to those related to social policy and equality.
Table 3
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authority to the European level covaries much more strongly with the strength of vested interests in
social policy and equality areas than in others. The proportion of explained variance is about 50
percent higher, which means 25 percent for social and equality issues and 17 percent for others
altogether. Secondly, the effect of legal regulation in the regression is only significant in the case of
social policy and equality issues (Table 4).
The results of these analyses clearly support the vested interest hypotheses. In countries where vested
interests are strong, this is an institutional barrier against a change in the distribution of policy
competencies between the nation-state and the European level. Furthermore, it is in particular in the
area of social policy and equality issues where the strength of corporatism constrains the institutional
flexibility of the national setting. 
Table 4
2.4. Competence Shift and National Parliaments’ Settings
Since we are interested in national differences, it is to be expected that factors of resistance and
support might be found mainly in the institutional contexts of the national political systems. Do
different national institutional settings result in more or less support of the transfer of power to the
European level, and why? To address this question, we turn to the role and strength of national
parliaments in policy-making.
It has been pointed out recently that „legislatures have been transformed from law-making to ...
law-effecting institutions“ (Norton 1996b: 3). The literature reports a substantial shift of legislative
power toward executive dominance in the making of public policies (Norton 1996b: 5). While this
might be a general trend, in fact, a great variety of interplay and counterplay of parliaments and
governments can be found across Europe.
9
The strength of parliaments in the legislative process thus could be imagined as a continuous variable
reaching from exclusive government power to exclusive parliamentary power. From organization
theory as well as from the rational actors approach it is known that, if possible, organizations and
actors tend to increase their power, scope, and size rather than to give something away. This tendency
is stronger when the organizations and actors are already strong. This would suggest that strong
parliaments put some constraint on shifting authority. This hypothesis is also plausible from the
perspective of democratic theory. Given that the European level still suffers from some institutional
deficits with respect to democratic control of government action, it is easy to understand that
legislators who have strong democratic control capacities at the national level would not like to
exchange this situation for one where democratic control is more doubtful. Thus, one can formulate
the following hypothesis: 
The more powerful a national parliament is, the more its members resist a shift of policy
competencies to the European level.
However, the excellent research of Döring and associates about national parliaments in Europe
provides very valuable indicators in this respect. In an exploratory factor analysis, Döring found three
dimensions of agenda control to be indicative of the strength of parliament vis-à-vis government
(Döring 1995a: 664). The first factor indicates the degree to which the parliament or the government
has control over the agenda (plenary timetable, timetable committees, hearings, etc.). The second
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describes the degree to which the plenum has the power to reverse the voting order, which gives it
more freedom to determine the policy results. Döring calls the first „Government priorities“, the
second „Committee drafting“, and the third „Whips’ power“. Scores for all three factors have been
added in this analysis in order to construct an overall measure of plenary power. 
The evidence shown in Figure 5 clearly indicates strong support of our hypothesis. Although the data
have to be read carefully due to the small number of cases, the correlation is quite high (Pearson’s r =
-.52). 
As we can see, the more powerful a parliament is vis-à-vis the government, the less MNPs support a
transfer of authority to the European level. Without the two outliers, Sweden and Italy, the
correlation would be almost perfect (-.94), and there might be some very good reasons why Italy and
Sweden differ from the general pattern. The Swedish case could be explained by a general attitude of
scepticism toward the ongoing integration process of the European Union. For Italy, a good
explanation might be more difficult to find. An ad hoc hypothesis is that Italian MPs are to a great
extent unsatisfied with the outcomes of the national political systems. In contradiction of our general
hypothesis, this might lead to a strong parliament being strongly in favour of shifting competencies to
the EU, i.e., of giving power away in order to produce more satisfactory outcomes.
Figure 5
10
2.5. A Model of Support for Policy Shift in the European Union
In order to combine the factors investigated so far and to determine their relative impact on support
for authority shift to the European level, a regression model will be tested, introducing all the factors
under consideration so far. From Table 2 we know that problem load and scope account for 34
percent of the variance in support. Introducing the dependency of a country on foreign trade adds
about 10 percent. Adding union density and privileges of the union systems adds another 10 percent
(Table 5). Unfortunately, it was not possible to include parliamentary power in the same model due to
multicolinearity with foreign trade dependency. Instead, we tested the same model in model 4 and 5
except for exchanging foreign trade dependency against power of national parliaments. Obviously,
parliamentary power has not such a strong impact on support for authority shift as foreign trade
dependency. However, its relevance cannot be neglected, since explained variance increases also
considerable 6 percentage points, seen from basic model 1.
Table 5
Due to multicolinearity between “Foreign Trade Dependency” and “Power of National Parliaments” it
was not possible to test a model including both variables at the same time.
Summarizing these results, two forces, driving support in opposite directions, can be detected: those
having to do with globalization, be it problems or the economy, and those being indicative for
particular national settings. The factors of globalization drive higher support, powerful national
settings for less support. Strong structures of interest intermediation and parliamentary representation
obviously put major constraints on support for competence shift to the European level where they do
exist. 
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One of the major problems, if not the most important one problem, is how to arrange democratic
control, i.e. representation and accountability, in the face of increasing competencies at the European
level and how to link the two levels of policy-making in the European Union. On the one hand, this is
a purely technical problem of co-ordination. On the other hand, it is a problem of political order in
general. Clearly, the technical co-ordination problems and the problems of political institutional order
are interrelated. At the moment, and for day-to-day politics, technical co-ordination problems are of
more practical relevance. For the future, the problem of political order is of greater relevance. Who
one believes should be co-ordinated in action and who should be controlled clearly depends on the
political order one has in mind. Should parliaments or governments play a larger role? Should national
parliaments have better means to control their governments’ action at the European level? Should
control be organized at the European or national level? 
Democracy has to solve the problems both of efficient policy-making and of democratic
representation (Shepsle 1988). The first can be regarded as a co-ordination problem; the second is a
two-sided problem. It relates to control and accountability on the one hand and to the link between
representatives and represented on the other. Judging from the views of parliamentarians with respect
to all three aspects, i.e., better co-ordination, better control, and better linkages, institutional
improvements can be made.
11
3.1. Institutional Improvements
Coordination and Control
Judging from the demands for institutional improvements, co-ordination between levels seems to be
the most central concern of parliamentarians at both levels. At both levels almost two-thirds favour
joint committees to debate community proposals and joint committee meetings. There is basically no
difference in judgement in this respect between MNPs and MEPs. The proposal to have a cabinet
minister in national governments responsible for European affairs is strongly supported by
European-level parliamentarians (82 percent), but less strongly by members of national parliaments
(63 percent). In contrast, stronger links between European Commissioners and members of national
parliaments are more strongly favoured by national parliamentarians. On the one hand, these results
clearly indicate that representatives at both levels perceive a major co-ordination problem. On the
other hand, they also reveal differences with respect to the latter two proposals, which might stem
from different views on the role of the institutions from which they come. A cabinet minister for
European affairs clearly would strengthen the European level. A stronger link between commissioners
and national parliamentarians would strengthen the national influence on European politics (Figure 6).
Improvement of democratic control and accountability also seems to be of central concern for
parliamentarians in Europe. One institutional means would be to make the debates about legislative
proposals in the Council of Ministers a matter of public record. This clearly would increase
transparency as well as the possibility to hold ministers accountable. Almost 90 percent of the
members of the European Parliament favour this proposal; for members of national parliaments the
figure is 75 percent, somewhat lower but still very high. Another possibility would be to have
„instructed ministers,“ i.e., ministers attending the Council should follow the instructions of their
national parliaments. Two-thirds of MNPs and about 57 percent of MEPs favour this proposal. A
third aspect of control is the recruitment of the European Commission. More than 60 percent of the
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while only 42 percent of the MNPs favour parliamentary election of the Commission. These figures
indicate that parliamentarians in Europe see even more need for change of control mechanisms than
for co-ordination. But again, differences in strength of demands betweenlevels are visible. They follow
the same patterns as for co-ordination: those strengthening European level politics are more favoured
by members of the European Parliament; those strengthening control capacities at the national level
are more favoured by national parliamentarians (Figure 6).
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The last aspect, strengthening the linkages between elected and electorates, is clearly crucial for
political representation. In an institutional sense, this relates to elections as the most central means of
translating the wishes of the represented into distributions of power (Dahl 1971, 1975; Held 1996:
204). European elections still do not really compare to national elections. The 1999 European
elections will be the first in which a proportional system is used in all countries, but European
elections still are not equal elections, given that the number of voters per seat differs strongly between
countries. This disproportionality exists for a good reason, to provide fair representation of smaller
countries in the European Parliament. It is not at all clear whether members of parliament in Europe
have this problem in mind when asking for the same electoral system in all member-states, but it is
evident that parliamentarians at both the European and the national level regard a common single
electoral system as necessary for European elections. More than two-thirds favour this. On the other
hand, compulsory voting is regarded as a means of improving the electoral link by only a small
number of MPs. Surprisingly, the proportion of parliamentarians supporting a European way of
candidate selection for European elections is even lower than that for compulsory voting. Selecting
candidates by European rather than national parties is regarded as the most effective means of
overcoming the weakness of the European party system in the (scientific) debate (Franklin, van der
Eijk, and Marsh 1996). The figures indicate, however, that parliamentarians do not see much need to
change the system of candidate recruitment. The implication is that they do not see much need to
strengthen the European parties either (Figure 6). Since support for this measure is low on both
levels, one might conclude that MEPs as well as MNPs are relatively satisfied with the national routes
to the European Parliament.
Figure 6
Distribution of Institutional Power
Some of these evaluations of proposals for institutional change obviously are related to the question
of distribution of power or influence. In this respect, members of the European Parliament and the
national parliaments clearly have a common view. First, their judgements about the actual distribution
of influence are very similar. Both groups regard the Council of Ministers as the most influential
institution in European politics, followed by the European Commission, and the national governments,
in that order. All three of these actors are regarded as having much or very much influence. The
European Parliament occupies a middle position closer to „little“ than „very much“ influence, while
the national parliaments are least influential in the perceptions of European parliamentarians. It is not
surprising that this distribution of power does not fit the interests of parliamentarians. Both groups of
parliamentarians want more influence for the European as well as the national parliaments, with
members of national parliaments even more supportive than members of the EP. They also want the
other three institutions to have somewhat reduced influence (Figure 7). The resulting power structure
would not be a reversal of the existing one. Rather, the result would be a more equalized distribution
of power in which the European Parliament would have equal influence with the Council of Ministers.
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3.2. Views on the Future Political Order of the European Union
With respect to the possible future of the political order in the European Union, models ranging from
more technocratic and regulatory to full-fledged democratic systems are under discussion. The debate
is both complex (Zürn 1995) and basically inspired by existing political models. The major alternatives
can described in opposing terms: intergovernmentalism vs. parliamentarism or confederation vs.
federation (W. Wessels 1996). These contrasts are not necessarily identical, since federalism can have
a parliamentary as well as a presidential form. In the discussions about the future political order,
however, they often coincide. The reason is that parliamentarism at the European level cannot be
conceived without some kind of federal political order, given that the European Union is composed of
different nations and the subsidiarity principle of the Union.
The basic characteristic of the two most prominent alternative models of political order can be
summarized quite parsimoniously. The intergovernmental model is based on the sovereignty of nation
states. It is a kind of „pooling of sovereignties“ (W. Wessels 1996: 23). The pooling of authority finds
its representation in the Council. Parliament does not play a role in this model, at least not at the
European level. At the national level, it is the basis of the legitimation of national governments acting
at the European level.
The parliamentary model, sometimes equated with the federal model, would require a total
rearrangement of the existing institutional setting. The role of the European Parliament at the
European level would become similar to that of national parliaments in the member states. There is
wide variation with respect to the concrete competencies of parliaments, their role in policy-making,
etc. (Norton 1996a). However, national parliaments are legislative bodies and they elect governments.
There are many more implications of these two general models with respect to divisions of power and
the shape of the concrete institutional setting, but basically they can be distinguished by the locus of
democratic legitimation. In the intergovernmental model, the power of the European level comes from
a pooling of authority of sovereign states, with national governments having the final say regarding
the scope of the power of the European level. In the parliamentary model, at least if fully developed,
power at the European level is high and its locus is the parliament.
Although the question of preferred political order cannot be directly addressed with our surveys, it
can be indirectly addressed by making use of two indicators relating to the power of the European
Union on the one hand and to the legislative authority of the European Parliament on the other hand.
Combining these two questions, models of political order can be differentiated which come very close
to the distinction between intergovernmentalism and parliamentarism. Conceptionalizing the two
dimensions in simple dichotomies and combining them leads to a four-fold table, presenting the
principle alternatives.
Table 6
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Distribution of Preferences
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different countries according to the proportions who either favour or not a system with high power
and a European Parliament with high legislative competencies, three of the four cells defined in Table
6 show cases. Parliamentarians of Denmark, Sweden, Finland, France, and Ireland fall into the
category weak state. Only about 15 to 35 percent favour a strong European Parliament and between 0
and 45 percent favour a European Union with increased responsibilities. But in France and Ireland,
only a few percentage-points are missing to make the majority of their parliamentarians supporters of
a strong intergovernmental order. Parliamentarians of Luxembourg and Portugal particularly favour
strong intergovernmentalism, but those of Greece, the Netherlands, and Austria also fall in this
category although being somewhat short of a majority for a strong parliamentary system.
Representatives of Great Britain, Germany and even more those of Belgium, Spain, and Italy favour
„strong parliamentarism“.
Figure 8
The differences indicate that there is no cross-nationally common view of parliamentarians on the
future political order. Without a common perspective, however, it is unlikely that clear decisions on
the future political order can easily be achieved.
The situation is even more complicated when differences between levels are taken into account. In
some countries, potential tensions between the European level perspective and the national
perspective are very strong. In particular in France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, majorities of
members of national parliaments favour a different political order than their counterparts in the
European Parliament. The direction of difference is most obvious: members of national parliaments in
these countries tend to favour either a weak state or strong intergovernmentalism; MEPs in these
countries favour strong parliamentarism (Table 7). It is also evident that the group classifications may
be unstable where only plurality positions exist. Again, these findings indicate that it will not be easy
to achieve a consensus about the future development of the political order at the EU-level, either
between levels or within groups.
Table 7
Cross cutting national and level differences, ideology also influences institutional preferences.
According to Hix and Lord (1998: 209), the left-right dimensions and anti- or pro-integration
attitudes define the cleavage system in the European Parliament. Hooghe and Marks (1999) explicitly
argue that contestation in the European Union is defined by a two-dimensional political space: social
democracy versus market liberalism constitutes one dimension; nationalism versus supranationalism
the other. They argue that regulated capitalism is supported by the political left, neoliberalism by the
political right.
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The definitions of the neoliberal model on the one hand and the regulatory model on the other almost
mirror the distinction between weak state and strong parliamentarism at the European level. The
neoliberal project means insulating markets from political interference, implying resistance to a
supranational Euro-polity. The model of regulated capitalism seeks to create a liberal democracy
capable of regulating markets and redistributing resources. Central to this project is the deepening of
democracy (Hooghe and Marks 1999: 82-8).
Political Order, Institutional Improvements, and Ideology(1)
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control and accountability, and better electoral linkage, empirical results support the hypothesis that
ideas about political order and its improvements relate to ideology. In particular, better control is
favoured more by the political left than by the right, fitting with the claim that a model of regulated
capitalism is concerned also with deepening of democracy (Table 8). The question of power
distribution also reflects differences in ideology. The political left clearly favours an increase in the
power of the European Parliament more than the right, and disfavours an increase of powers of the
European Commission and the Council of Ministers, which again indicates the concern with
democratic means. 
Table 8
These findings suggest that supranationalism has its political home more with the left than the right.
This is also reflected in the level of support for a strong European Union and a strong European
Parliament. Whereas about seventy percent of the most leftist support both strong EU and strong EP,
on the right only one-third are for a strong EP and almost a half for a strong EU (Figure 9).
Ideology is also reflected in preferences regarding a future political order. Two-thirds of the leftist
MEPs and a small majority (52 percent) of leftist MNPs favour a strong parliamentary state. The
corresponding figure for the political right is 25 percent for both levels. The majority of the political
right favours a weak European state (Table 9). Ideology determines preferences for a future political
order in a similar way at the European and the national level. This might be a sign that ideology can
form a shell in which consensus can be reached across levels. But the finding also shows that tensions
within levels might persist because they are founded in ideological differences.
Figure 9 | Table 9
Political Order Preferences and its Macrostructural Determinants
So far analyses show, that there are clear tensions between countries, levels, and ideological groups
concerning the kind of future order of the European Union and institutional changes members of
parliament in Europe support. For the dimension of authority shift, we have shown that differences
between representatives of different countries can be explained at least partly by the variations across
countries in their export dependency and strength of national settings both for of interest group
systems and parliaments. 
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Here, I investigate briefly, whether this type of explanation applies also to attitudes toward the future
political order in Europe. However, since we deal here with country groups of members of national
parliaments and the EP, the number of cases is very small. Therefore, in contrast to the analysis of
support for competence shift, regression analysis cannot be applied. Discriminant analysis is used
instead. Discriminant analysis is a exploratory method allowing to test as to which degree belonging
to groups with certain characteristics can be predicted by independent variables. In our case, group
membership is defined by the mean position a country group of representatives with respect to their
preference for the future political order, i.e. supporters of a weak state, intergovernmentalism, and
parliamentarism (see Table 6 and Figure 8). Independent variables include export dependency,
structure of the union system, and strength of national parliaments. Due to multi-collinearity , export
dependency and parliamentary strength cannot be included in the same analysis. In order to have some
yardstick how good prediction is, this analysis will also be applied to the dimension of competence
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Thus, with the help of discriminant analysis it is tested whether the globalization of the economy
hypothesis formulated in section 2.2 and the vested interest hypothesis formulated in section 2.3, both
applied to competence shift also can account for the different preferences for the future political order
of the EU.
As can be seen in Table 10, the knowledge of the characteristics of the union systems and export
dependency of a country allows a correct classification of 83 percent of groups of representatives.
Export dependency leads to a greater support of the parliamentary model, a strong union system to
higher support for the intergovernmental solution. A similar structure can be found with respect to
competence shift, as we know from the regression analyses above and can be seen in Table 10 as well.
Comparing the share of correctly classified groups, the state model comes out better but the number
of cases is also much lower.
Taking into account parliamentary strength instead of export dependency, discriminant analysis
performs rather poor than good, but showing the expected direction of effect: MPs who come from
countries with strong parliaments rather support a weak state or an intergovernmental solution.
Results clearly demonstrate, that with respect to preferences for political order, “country” makes a
difference. The degree of embeddedness of a country in a globalized economy causes parliamentarians
to prefer a parliamentary model over weak state, strong national instutitional settings at home tear in
the opposite direction. Thus, the double structure of forces found with regard to competence shift is
at work here as well. But the two forces drive support in opposite directions.
Table 10
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4. Conclusions
Is it possible to square the circle? This question was raised in the sub-title of the paper and meant of
looking for chances and constraints for finding an institutional solution to the pressing problem in the
European Union of establishing more democratic forms of representation and control. 
Analyses of two central dimensions of political integration, i.e. attribution of authority and democratic
control, show, that there is no consensus between parliamentarians in Europe about what the shape of
the future EU should be. It has been shown that support for competence shift and the preferences for
the future political order are shaped by economic and institutional factors differing between nation
states, and, with regard to competence shift, also by the nature of policy problems, i.e. problem scope
and transnational problem load. Parliamentary support for further European integration in the sense of
competence shift to the EU level and the development of a parliamentary political system in the EU
correlates positively with the degree to which a nation is exposed to conditions of global economy and
negatively with the strength of national institutions, both of the intermediary system and the national
parliaments vis-a-vis national governments. 
Thus, several dimensions of conflict cross-cut: differences between levels, i.e. the European and the
national level; differences between nations, regardless of level; differences between ideological
groups. Forces are driving into opposite directions, but cross-cutting “cleavages” does not necessarily
imply that consensual solutions are easy to reach. 
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minds of parliamentarians. Evaluations of concrete institutional reforms and more general preferences
for a political order show the same pattern. On the one hand, this might be a good sign, since if ideas
about concrete measures match ideas of a more general kind, the chance is higher that the outcome
will be something that is internally consistent.
On the other hand, differences between parliamentarians of different countries and at different levels
can result in very different opinions about the changes needed. These differences can be explained by
structural factors which cannot be changed so easily: different degrees of embededdness in
international trade and different national institutional settings. Strong parliaments and strong vested
interests at home clearly put a major constraint for implementing a European institutional solution. At
the same time, globalization of problems and the economy seems to tear in the opposite direction. 
But there is no obvious majority position that has a chance to get through without serious opposition.
Furthermore, there is a clear ideologically-based split in the envisaged prospects of the future Union.
Ideology seems to be a mighty shell in this respect. It seems that differences between countries and
between levels are cancelled out to a certain degree by ideological positions. But differences between
the political left and political right are so striking that ideology on the one hand unites and on the
other hand divides. Even if one of the ideological groups could claim that it represents the majority, it
would be doubtful that it could implement its own vision of political order. The implementation of a
political order at the European level needs consensus as a base. Majority decisions would not be
accepted. Given the differences and tensions in attitudes between countries, levels, and ideological
groups, it seems that consensus is far from feasible. If this is true, the same applies for the
construction of a European political order.
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Appendix
The 1996 MEP Study (MEP 96) and 
the MNP studies (MNP 96) 
The study among the members of the European Parliament (MEP 96) was co-ordinated by Bernhard
Wessels and funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. The survey was carried out by
INFRATEST BURKE in Spring 1996. The study among the members of the national parliaments
(MNP 96) was co-ordinated by Bernhard Wessels and Jacques Thomassen. National study directors
were Irene Delgado and Lourdes Lopez Nieto in Spain; Louisa Gardella in Italy; Sören Holmberg,
Martin Brothen, and Peter Esaiasson in Sweden; Manina Kakepati in Greece; Christina Leston
Bandeira in Portugal; Michael Marsh and Mary Clare O’Sullivan in Ireland; Bernhard Wessels and
Achim Kielhorn in Germany; Lieven de Winter and Patrick Dumont in Belgium and Luxembourg; and
Colette Ysmal in France. Overhead funds for this part of the study were provided by the universities
of Mannheim and Twente and the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. Table A.1 informs about fieldwork
period, number of interviews, return rates, and representativity of both the MEP Study and the MNP
Studies. 
Given the great variation in return rates, the question of representativity of the studies is of major
importance. Representativity has been tested for party and gender and, where data were available, for
age (and for the MEP study also for nation). The Duncan index of dissimilarity, measuring deviations
between the original and the sample distributions, shows that altogether sample deviations from the
real distributions are acceptably low in most studies. For both the MEP Study and the MNP studies,
the deviation of party composition in the samples from their universes is about eight percentage
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national studies the Duncan index is below ten in most cases except for party and age for some
countries. A methodological caveat may remain for those countries with extreme low return rates.
However, since most analyses reported in this book describe relations between variables rather than
distributions of individual variables, this potential problem should be minimised.
The data of both studies are available from the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung,
Cologne, Germany, (Study Number 3078 [MEP 96] and Study Number 3079 [MNP 96]).
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Endnotes
(*) I like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful and competent comments. I tried to
incorporate as many improvements as possible but was clearly not able to take care of all suggestions.
Some of them need more time to think about and will have impact on future works. The paper is
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The European Parliament, National Parliaments, and European Integration, edited by Richard Katz
and myself, Oxford University Press (May 1999). It extends the findings there by enlarging the model
for competence shift (section 2) and introducing macro-theoretical explanations for preferences for
the future political order in Europe (section 3). A study description can be found in the appendix.
(1) Interestingly enough, ideology does not play a systematic – at least not statistically significant –
role with regard to competence shift. Therefore, a respective sub-section is missing in section 2.
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Parliamentarians’ Satisfaction with the Working of Democracy
in the European Union and in Their Countries
MEP MNP
EU  own
country 
EU  own
country 
%  %  %  % 
very satisfied  5  14  3  15 
fairly satisfied  46  58  47  65 
not very satisfied  37  22  40  17 
not at all satisfied  13  7  10  3 
N = 100 % 310 1392
Table 2
Summary Table of 23 Regressions of Policy Competencies
Attribution to the European Level on Problem Load and
Problem Scope
Groups/Regressions  R2  x (Load)  x (Scope) 
Mean all  0.62  0.19  0.62 
Mean MEPs  0.63  0.20  0.66 
Mean MNPs  0.60  0.18  0.57 
Cross-country regression  0.34***  0.19**  0.62*** 
Aggregate regression of mean competence score for 17 policy areas for 15 groups of country MEPs
and 11 groups of MNPs (n=17 for each regression); cross country regression n = 442. 
* sign. at .05; ** sign. at .01; *** sign at .001.
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Table 3
Vested Interests and Resistance to Shift in Policy Competencies
to the European Level
Corporatism Score Union Density 1970-1990 Legal Regulation of Union Systems
(Correlation with Overall Competence Score)
All  -0.43 
(n = 18) 
-0.57** 
(n = 26) 
-0.46* 
(n = 24) 
MEP  -0.35 
(n = 11) 
-0.64** 
(n = 14) 
-0.46 
(n = 14) 
MNP only  -0.72 
(n = 7) 
-0.43 
(n = 11) 
-0.48 
(n = 10) 
* sign. at .05.; ** sign. at .01. 
Independent variables are intervall scales.
Table 4
Regression of Competence Shift for Non-Social Policy and
Social Policy Issues on the Strength of Vested Interests
R2  Beta 
(Union Density) 
Beta 
(Legal Regul.) 
Regression 1 for:  Non-Social Policy Issues  0.17***  -0.40***  -0.01 
Regression 2 for:  Social Policy and Equality Issues  0.25***  -0.25**  -0.30** 
Aggregate regression across policy fields and countries.
Number of cases: non-social policy issues 288; social policy and equality issues (social policy, health,
unemployment, taxation, and education) 120.
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Table 5
Full Model of the Explanation of Differences in Support for
Shifting Policy Competencies to the European Level
Model 1 
beta 
Model 2 
beta 
Model3 
beta 
Model 4 
beta 
Model 5 
beta 
Problem Load  0.13***  0.14**  0.14***  0.14***  0.14*** 
Problem Scope  0.53***  0.51***  0.51***  0.52***  0.52*** 
Foreign Trade Dependency  0.32***  0.29*** 
Union Density  -0.19***  -0.25*** 
Legal Regulation of Union Systems  -0.17***  -0.08*** 
Power of National Parliaments  -0.20***  -0.13** 
Explained Variance (adj. R2)  0.34***  0.43***  0.53***  0.40***  0.46*** 
Aggregate regression, cases: policy fields times groups [14 MEP; 10 MNP]), max n = 432, min n =
340. 
* sign. at .05; ** sign. at .01; *** sign. at .001.
 
 
Table 6
Models of Political Order
Responsibilities of the European Union
low  high 
Power of the EP to pass laws which
directly apply in the member states 
low  Weak State  Strong Intergovernmentalism 
directly apply in the member states  high  Weak Parliamentarism  Strong Parliamentarism 
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Plurality/Majority Preference for Political Order of MEP and
MNP
Weak State  Strong Intergovernmentalism  Weak Parliamentarism  Strong Parliamentarism 
AU  MEP (p) 
BE  MEP; MNP 
DE  MEP 
FI  MEP 
FR  MNP  MEP 
GE  MEP; MNP(p) 
GR  MNP (p)  MEP 
IR  MEP; MNP 
IT  MEP; MNP 
LU  MNP (p)  MEP 
NE  MNP (p)  MEP 
PO  MEP; MNP 
SP  MEP; MNP 
SW  MEP; MNP 
GB  MEP 
MEP = Members of the European Parliament (without [p] majority position, otherwise plurality position) 
MNP = Members of National Parliaments (without [p] majority position, otherwise plurality position) 
Table 8
Left-Right Ideological Position, Institutional Change and
Preferred Political Order
Correlation with 
Left-Right Self-placement 
Better coordination (summary score)   .06 
Better control (summary score)   .25*** 
Better electoral link (summary score)   .13*** 
Demand for increase in power of:  *** = sig .000
  - national parliaments   .04 
  - the European Parliament   .20*** 
  - national governments  -.17*** 
  - European Commission   .01 
  - Council of Ministers  -.18*** 
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Table 9
State Modela and Political Ideologyb
MEP MNP
Left  Centre  Right  Left  Centre  Right 
%  %  %  %  %  % 
Weak state  18  20  68  27  40  54 
Strong non-parliamentary state  9  9  4  13  19  17 
Weak parliamentary state  7  9  4  8  7  4 
Strong parliamentary state  66  61  25  52  34  25 
n = 100 %  122  142  28  390  776  175 
a 
Combination of attitudes toward a European Parliament which had the power to pass laws
directly and attitudes toward increasing range of responsibilities of the EU. Both 7-point scales,
first three highest categories in favor against rest, combined as follows: not in favour of strong
EP or strong EU: weak state; in favour of strong EU but not EP: strong non-parliamentary
state; in favour of a strong EP but not EU: weak parliamentary state; in favour of strong EP
and strong EU: strong parliamentary state. 
b 
Left-Right self-placement on a 10-point scale, where 1 is left and 10 is right. 1, 2, 3 coded as
left; 4, 5, 6, 7 coded as center; 8, 9, 10 
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Table 10
Discriminant Analyses of Competence Shift and State Model
Preferences
Competence Shift State Modela
Std. Canonical Function
Coeff./
Correlation with Function
1
  - Load 0.30 / 0.69 - / -
  - Scope 0.82 / 0.38 - / -
  - Export Dependency 0.51 / 0.30 0.97 / 0.51
  - Union Density -0.32 / -0.33 -0.96 / -0.52
  - Legal Regulation -0.24 / -0.22 -0.03 / -0.19
Number of cases 442 24
Number of Groups defined 5 3
Groups/Group Values on Function 1: 
1. contra shift -1.49 1. Weak State -2.89
2. -0.72 2. Intergov. 1.44
3. 0.12 3. Parliament 0.83
4. 0.90
5. pro shift  1.28
Explained Variance,
Function 1 88.18 99.03
Eta2 (function 1 score by
group) 0.51*** 0.76***
R2 (function 1 score
regressed on group) 0.50*** 0.44***
Correctly Classified in % 44.61 83.33
Mean % Correctly
Classified 45.0 72.6
Mean % above Prior
Probability 25.2 39.3
*** sig. P < 0.000
a  (strong EU + strong EP)/2.
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Table A.1
Summary Table of Returns for MEP- and MNP-Studies (MEP
96, MNP 96)
Study Fieldwork Number of
Respondents
Return
Rate
Duncan Index of Dissimilaritya
regarding
Country  Party  Gender  Age
Groups 
MEP-Study  20.05.- 21.6.1996  314  50.2  9.11  7.99  0.32  3.50 
MNP-Studies:  (29.4.1996-10.7.1997)  1367  37.6  n.a.  7.01  1.45  2.97 
- Belgiumb  3.6.1996-28.4.1997  87  58.0  n.a.  7.20  0.60  4.00 
- France  2.7.1996-10.7.1997  146  25.3  n.a.  7.70  0.40  6.90 
- Germany  21.5.-6.8.1996  317  47.2  n.a.  6.80  1.50  5.60 
- Greece  15.4.-31.7.1996  60  20.0  n.a.  16.30 0.70  11.30 
- Ireland  9.7.-25.10.1996  71  42.8  n.a.  3.20  0.00  - 
- Italy  June-Oct. 1996  94  14.9  n.a.  18.30 2.40  - 
- Luxembourg  12.6.1996-28.2.1997  28  46.7  n.a.  14.10 3.10  - 
- Netherlands  29.4.-19.7.1996  65  43.3  n.a.  10.70 3.60  - 
- Portugal  13.6.-4.8.1996  54  23.5  n.a.  8.50  0.50  - 
- Spain  Autumn 1996  130  37.1  n.a.  4.90  2.80  - 
- Sweden  5.3.-10.12.1996  315  90.3  n.a.  1.80  1.30  0.80 
a 
Duncan Index of Dissimilarity measures the percentage point differences between distributions,
in this case between distribution in the uni verse and the sample. It ranges from 0 (no
difference) to 100 (100 percent difference). 
b 
House of Representatives. 
n.a. 
not applicable. 
- 
not available. 
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Figure 1
Classification of Policy Areas According to Cross-country
Problem Load and Cross-border Problem Scope
Cross-country 
Problem Load 
High (3)  Unemployment    Agriculture 
Environment 
Immigrants 
Medium (2)  Region. Devel. 
Social Policy 
Crime 
Economy 
Research 
Defence 
Devel. Countries 
Foreign Policy 
Low (1)  Health 
Education 
Tax 
Media  Money 
Low 
(1) 
Medium 
(2) 
High 
(3) 
Cross-border 
Problem Scope
Assigned scores in brackets.
 
 
Figure 2
Competence Level and Problem Character, MEPs
 
Horizontal axis: scores from figure 1
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Competence Level and Problem Character, MNPs of
11National Parliaments
 
Figure 4
Economic Interdependency and Overall Support for Shifting
Policy Competencies to the European Level
 
Correlations for Overall Competence Score: MEP and MNP (24 cases; Luxembourg missing): 0.46*;
MEP only (14 cases): 0.49; MNP only (10 cases): 0.48.
* sign. at .05.
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Competence Level and Distribution of Power between National
Parliaments and National Governments in 11 Member States
 
Note: Entries are predicted values. 
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Evaluation of Proposals for Institutional Change
 
Judgements based on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (very much for) to 7 (very much against).
Percentages represent portion of answers with scale values of 1, 2, and 3.
Figure 7
Perceived Influence of Institutions of European Policy-making
and Demanded Increase or Decrease of Influence
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Preferences for Models of Political Order
 
Based on a seven-point scale where 1 indicates very much in favour of a strong EU or EP and 7
indicates being against. Percentage of answers favouring.
Figure 9
EU-Power, EP Power, and Ideology
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